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Abstract: The morality of abortion is a longstanding controversy. One may wonder whether it’s 
even possible to make significant progress on an issue over which so much ink has already been 
split and there is such polarizing disagreement (Boyle 1994). The papers in this issue show that this 
progress is possible—there is more to be said about abortion and other crucial beginning-of-life 
issues. They do so largely by applying contemporary philosophical tools to moral questions 
involving life’s beginning. The first two papers defend the pro-life view from recent objections 
involving miscarriage and abortion doctors. The third shows how the social model of disability and 
the concept of transformative experience applies to classic debates like abortion and euthanasia. 
The final two papers address how rights and harms apply to children and to beings that do not yet 
exist. All five papers make a noteworthy contribution to the moral issues that arise at the beginning 
of life.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Is abortion morally wrong? If so, do we have counterintuitive moral duties—like the duty to kill 
abortion doctors or to put most of our resources toward fighting miscarriage? How does recent 
work in other areas of applied ethics, such as the relationship between disability and well-being, 
bear on the ethics of abortion? What rights do pre-autonomous children have? What duties, if any, 
do we have to beings that do not yet exist? This is a sampling of some of the questions addressed 
in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.   
While this isn’t a special issue on abortion, all of the papers either directly address or have 
implications for beginning-of-life issues. The first two papers address abortion directly, and more 
specifically, defend the pro-life view—the view that abortion is normally morally wrong—against 
recent objections.1  The third paper doesn’t defend a pro-life or a pro-choice position, but instead 
explains how the disability rights movement has commitments in common with both views. It 
shows, among other things, how both sides can learn from the disability rights community. The 
                                                        
1 The issue of precisely defining “pro-life” and “pro-choice” is difficult, and both views encompass a variety of 
perspectives. For our purposes, the pro-life view is the view that abortion is usually morally wrong, and the pro-choice 
view is the view that abortion is usually morally permissible. Both sides also tend to take opposite views on the legal 
question—whether abortion should be legal—but the legal question is importantly distinct from the moral one.  
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final two papers consider the moral standing of two groups: children and beings that do not exist. 
While these final papers aren’t explicitly about abortion, both address the difficult moral question 
of how we should treat parties who cannot consent to our actions. This is instructive for thinking 
not only about abortion, but also about ethical procreation and our duties to children.2 
The papers are diverse. They address both normative and applied topics, and touch on a 
wide array of themes including miscarriage, the non-identity problem, our duties to children, the 
morality of self-defense, disability & well-being, and rights & permissions. At the same time, they 
bring longstanding, classic ethical debates—such as abortion and euthanasia—into conversation 
with newer ideas. Some of these ideas arise from the philosophical literature—such as the social 
model of disability and the transformative experience literature—while others draw from recent 
popular movements, like the Black Lives Matter movement.  
 
 
2. Abortion and Miscarriage 
 
In “Miscarriage is Not a Cause of Death,” Nicholas Colgrove responds to Amy Berg’s (2017) 
article about abortion and miscarriage. Berg notes that miscarriage kills many more than abortion. 
If fetuses are persons at conception, then miscarriage is one of the biggest public health crises of 
our time. For this reason, Berg argues that the defender of personhood at conception (PAC) must 
either admit that fetuses are not persons from the moment of conception, or should immediately 
and substantially shift their time, energy, and resources toward preventing miscarriage. In other 
words, defenders of PAC either must admit they are being inconsistent, or they must radically 
change their priorities, focusing much more on miscarriage.3  
 Colgrove formalizes Berg’s argument, noting that it relies on two crucial premises (p. XX, 
emphasis his):  
                                                        
2 And the morality of abortion and our duties to children are connected—see Wreen (1987), Strong (1997), Warren 
(2000), and Singer (2011).  
3 See Ord (2008), Simkulet (2017), and Räsänen (2018) for arguments similar to Berg’s. Interestingly, others have 
thought that the pain of miscarriage actually supports a pro-life position—if abortion is morally neutral, it is difficult to 
explain why miscarriage is a tragedy. See Harman (1999), Stoyles (2015), and Porter (2015).  
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1. Miscarriage kills far more people than abortion. 
  
2. If miscarriage kills far more people than abortion, then PAC opponents of 
abortion should either (i) dramatically shift their attention, resources, etc., to the 
prevention of miscarriage, or (ii) admit that they do not actually believe (or 
consistently adhere to) the claim that fetuses are persons from the moment of 
conception.  
 
Since many adherents of PAC are resistant to (i), Berg claims, we have good reason to think (ii) is 
true. Colgrove objects to both premises. Against premise 1, he notes that the idea that miscarriage 
kills anyone is strictly speaking false (p. XX): “miscarriage is not a cause of death. It is not capable 
of causing death, nor does it tend to cause death. Miscarriage is not a disease either. It is an outcome.” 
We should thus revise the premise to read that the causes of miscarriage cause more deaths than 
abortion. This brings us to a related problem: there isn’t one thing—the causes of miscarriage—
that leads to millions of deaths. Rather, miscarriages are the result of a large number of separate 
conditions, including chromosomal abnormalities, uterine abnormalities, thyroid problems, 
diabetes-related issues, and others. These are different conditions that need to be treated in 
different ways. Finally, not all miscarriages involve the death of a person, even if PAC is correct. 
In some cases, the fertilization process is incomplete, so what is growing is not a person, because 
conception has not occurred (see Lee 1996; Beckwith 2007; Beckwith & Thornton 2020).  
 Colgrove then objects to premise 2. To do so, he utilizes an analogy with the Black Lives 
Matter movement. The Black Lives Matter movement criticizes and calls for reform to our political 
and legal systems, because police officers often utilize excessive and even lethal force when 
confronting African Americans. In turn, some opponents of the Black Lives Matter then point out 
that the number of African Americans killed by other African Americans (who aren’t police 
officers) is much greater than those killed by police officers. Defenders of the Black Lives Matter 
movement reply that, even if this is true, it completely misses the point. The movement is meant 
to address a particular strand of injustice—racism expressed by the excessive violence of law 
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enforcement officials. Their goal isn’t necessarily to save as many lives as possible, but to address 
a specific kind of violent discrimination. This objection to the movement is a red herring.  
This same style of response is available to the defender of PAC against Berg’s objection. 
The pro-life movement is focused on rectifying what they take to be a serious, but specific, 
injustice. Their goal isn’t simply to save as many lives as possible—most are not committed 
utilitarians.4 While saving lives is one of their goals, Colgrove points out that they are also 
concerned with preventing violence against the innocent, the violation of parental obligations, and 
the dehumanization of human persons, among other things (p. XX). Miscarriage is a tragedy, but 
defends of PAC are focused on preventing a set of specific evils, and thus they are not inconsistent 
if they continue to focus on preventing abortion, rather than miscarriage.  
Finally, Colgrove points out the Berg’s argument relies on an empirical premise: that 
people, especially defenders of PAC, are doing virtually nothing about miscarriage. However, 
Colgrove explains that hundreds of millions of dollars are being spent on fertility research and 
treatment—significantly more than is devoted to anti-abortion causes. Further, some causes of 
miscarriage, such as chromosomal abnormalities, are likely untreatable. Investing money in them 
is quite risky, and the probability of success should be considered. Finally, some of the methods 
involved in miscarriage research and treatment are ones that many defenders of PAC morally 
object to, as they risk harming both women and embryos.5 In these cases—where there’s a low 
probability of success, or one takes a research method to be morally objectionable—proponents 
of PAC can consistently support pro-life causes over anti-miscarriage ones. 
 
 
3. Killing to Protect the Innocent? 
 
Berg’s argument involving miscarriage isn’t the only reductio that has been leveled against pro-life 
views. Others have argued that, if the pro-life position is correct, then it is morally permissible to 
                                                        
4 In good company with philosophers on both sides of the abortion issue—e.g. Thomson (1971), Roach (1979), 
Gillam (1998). 
5 See Khushf (1997), King (1997), Curzer (2004), and Block (2010) for more on the morality of stem cell research.  
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kill abortion doctors. After all, we think it is often permissible to kill an attacker to defend an 
innocent person. If abortion is the killing of an innocent person, as the pro-life view implies, then 
it may be permissible to kill abortion doctors (see e.g. McMahan 2007).  
 In “How Not to Defend the Unborn,” David Hershenov and Philip A. Reed defend the 
pro-life view from this reductio. They focus on the following claim: “if a morally responsible 
attacker plans to kill two or more innocent individuals, then defensive violence against him is 
permissible” (p. XX). They make two points. One, the pro-lifer can consistently reject this claim. 
Two, even if a pro-lifer accepts it, it need not authorize killing abortion doctors.  
 First, they consider two ways a pro-lifer may reject the claim about the permissibility of 
defensive violence. One, several well-known pro-lifers are, in fact, pacifists; they maintain that 
intentional killing is always wrong (McNair & Zunes 2008; Bernardin 2008). Two, the pro-lifer 
may not be a pacifist, but they might suspend judgment about when lethal violence is permissible. 
After all, working out a consistent, theoretical account of when lethal violence is permissible is no 
easy task—philosophers have been attempting it for centuries. One might then simply maintain 
both that abortion is wrongful killing and it is wrong to kill abortion doctors, without an explicit 
commitment to a general theory of defensive violence. 
 Before turning to the second half of Hershenov and Reed’s article, a quick detour. Notice 
that Berg’s miscarriage argument and McMahan’s abortion doctor argument are structurally 
similar. Both claim that pro-lifers don’t believe what they claim to believe—e.g. that abortion is 
murder or that life begins at conception—because of other views or policies pro-lifers hold—an 
unwillingness to e.g. kill abortion doctors or to spend most of their resources fighting miscarriage. 
However, both arguments rely on an oversimplified view of what it is to believe something. As 
Hersnov and Reed suggest (p. XX), many of us have beliefs that are in tension—maybe one of 
our beliefs implies something inconsistent with another belief. We might even hold contradictory 
beliefs without realizing it. Further, having a belief doesn’t psychologically (or rationally) require a 
willingness to act on the belief (see Jackson 2019). A pro-lifer could even believe that it is 
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permissible to kill an abortion doctor, but not act on this belief because of the risk of being wrong. 
Then, Berg’s and McMahan’s arguments are more plausible when taken as an abstract reductio of 
the pro-life view—e.g. if life begins at conception, then we have counterintuitive obligations—
rather than a psychological point about what pro-lifers do or do not believe.  
 In the second part of the paper, Hershnov and Reed argue that even if pro-lifers accept 
the claim in question—that it’s permissible to use defensive violence against morally responsible 
attackers—they need not be committed to the permissibility of killing abortion doctors. On many 
views, this sort of violence is justified under only very specific conditions: for example, the threat 
is imminent, and the force is necessary to propel the attack (e.g. killing to defend young children 
at a school shooting). These conditions aren’t realized in virtually all cases of abortion. Killing an 
abortion doctor normally wouldn’t save a fetus’s life—the woman would simply go to another 
doctor or clinic. And in general, it’s a complex empirical question whether killing doctors and 
harassing abortion clinics actually reduces the number of abortions, and there’s some compelling 
evidence that it does not (p. XX). Thus, the effects of pro-life violence simply aren’t well 
established, and this violence doesn’t obviously protect the unborn. 
 Hershnov and Reed don’t want their argument to depend merely on empirical 
considerations about the effectiveness of killing abortion doctors, however. Their third point takes 
a more theoretical approach. In cases of abortion, the fetus crucially depends on the mother’s body 
for survival. So the pregnant woman who aborts a fetus is letting someone die whose life she was 
saving, i.e. sustaining (p. XX). If I’ve been sustaining someone’s life, but I am about to withdraw 
my aid and let that person die, that does not give you the moral right to kill me in defensive 
violence.6 That would be similar to killing the agent with the healthy kidneys as she decides to 
unplug from the violinist (Thomson 1971).  
                                                        
6 Although one might wonder if this is a case where something like Block (2014)’s evictionism might be appropriate. 
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 Note two further things in support of this final point. First, it seems permissible to kill a 
Nazi or a school shooter to save innocent lives. Neither the Nazi nor the school shooter are letting 
innocent people die that they were using their bodies to support (p. XX). So the moral principle 
Hershnov and Reed suggest gives the right result in many cases. Second, this story could also be a 
partial explanation for the common pro-life view that it is mistaken to punish a woman who gets 
an abortion—there are key moral differences between abortion and traditional cases of killing the 
innocent (p. XX). 
 
 
4. Learning from the Disability Rights Community 
 
The third paper does not directly defend a pro-life or pro-choice view. Nonetheless, it effectively 
points out ways that both sides of the abortion debate can learn from a third group: the disability 
rights community.  
 Disability has received more attention in philosophy as of late—both questions about the 
relationship between disability and well-being (Koch 2004; Cooper 2007; Barnes 2016) and 
questions about disability and abortion, especially the case of knowingly having a disabled child 
(Vehmas 2002; Stangl 2010; Melanson 2013; Douglas & Devolder 2013; Williams 2017). Shane 
Clifton, in “Disability and the Complexity of Choice in the Ethics of Abortion and Voluntary 
Euthanasia”, addresses both types of questions. Specifically, he discusses how the major players in 
the abortion debate can learn from both the social model of disability and the concept of 
transformative experience. He then applies his remarks to the ethics of voluntary euthanasia. 
Clifton first points out that both pro-life and pro-choice views have common 
commitments with disability rights advocates. The pro-life point of view emphasizes the value of 
all life, including the disabled, citing this as a reason that abortion is impermissible. Disability rights 
advocates also emphasize the value of disabled lives—and some, such as Barnes (2016), even argue 
that having a disability does not itself detract from well-being. On the other hand, those who 
advocate for a pro-choice view, such as feminists, emphasize both individual autonomy and the 
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importance of social services to protect and help those in need. Disability rights advocates agree—
autonomy is important, especially for the disabled. They also advocate for social support for needy 
and marginalized groups.  
 Clifton then turns to the social model of disability. On the social model, disability isn’t 
merely an impairment, but a product of a social or cultural environment.7 However, in most 
discussions of abortion and disability, an individualist, medical model of disability is assumed. Since 
on this second model of disability, the “problem” of disability lies with the individual (see Newell 
2006), pro-choicers advocate for the right to kill the disabled fetus, and pro-lifers simply attempt 
to protect the fetus with legislation (p. XX).  
The social model of disability expands the possibilities beyond these narrow, opposing 
viewpoints, and highlights ways that both sides can learn from the disability rights community. 
The pro-life position, which boasts in their emphasis on the value and sanctity of all life, seems to 
be hyper-focused on the fetus only during the nine months of pregnancy. They pay less attention 
to the social context before and after birth. A truly “pro-life” view would also address problems 
of poverty and social injustice, both for the mother and for the child post-birth (see McHugh 
1994). The pro-choice view claims to value autonomy and to oppose unjust paternalism. At the 
same time, they exclude the autonomy of the disabled, ignore the testimony of those with 
disabilities, and even advocate for the termination of disabled fetuses. If they consistently valued 
autonomy, they would also value the autonomy of those with disabilities, and see that the negative 
aspects of disability are often due to societal discrimination. The lesson for the pro-choice 
community is that we should put our efforts toward fighting anti-disability discrimination and 
stigma, rather than terminating disabled fetuses.  
 Clifton then relates the discussion of disability and abortion to transformative experiences. 
Clifton explains that for many years, we didn’t have the technology to detect disabilities before 
                                                        
7 For discussions of the definition of disability, including some criticisms of the social view, see Newel (2006), Cox-
White & Boxall (2008), Anastasiou & Kauffman (2013), Barnes (2016: ch. 1), Beaudry (2016), Jackson et al (2021: ch. 
17).  
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birth. But now, we can often know, well before birth, if a child is disabled. This raises a host of 
ethical questions. Clifton argues that we can make progress on these questions by noting that the 
choice of whether to have a disabled child is transformative. A transformative choice is one that 
changes a person’s perspective, understanding of the world, and/or preferences (Paul 2014). 
Parenting a disabled child often radically changes one’s view of disability. Before giving birth to a 
disabled child, many cannot appreciate the rich, flourishing lives those with disabilities often have, 
and relatedly, how rewarding it can be to raise and parent a disabled child. This is crucial for those 
engaged in debates involving abortion and disability to consider.  
 Transformative decisions are notoriously difficult, but we can make them in a more or less 
informed way. Clifton rightfully emphasizes the importance of letting disabled voices speak to 
these decisions. He reminds us that “nondisabled individuals are poorly equipped to imagine 
disabled lives” (p. XX). He explains (p. XX): 
Nondisabled people are generally unaware that people with disabilities report to be 
living good lives; that disabled people are as happy (and as sad) as everyone else 
(Clifton 2018: 95–118). Indeed, there is a tendency to underestimate the functional 
capacity of disabled people, overestimate their suffering, and ignore the love and 
joy experienced by the families and friends with whom they share their lives 
(Saxton 2013). More broadly, mainstream culture fails to appreciate the rich 
contribution made by the diversity of people with disabilities to the flourishing of 
local communities and the broader society. 
 
This isn’t simply something only for philosophers to consider, but applies to society generally, 
including expecting mothers and medical professionals. We should listen to disabled voices and 
be educated about the social aspects of disability before prescribing or making difficult decisions, 
such as whether to continue with the pregnancy of a disabled child. While the transformative 
aspect of this decision bears on, but doesn’t fully answer, the relevant ethical questions, Clifton 
makes a categorical prescription: we ought to exhibit epistemic humility and listen to the testimony 
of disabled people.  
 Finally, the above considerations are applied to another difficult ethical issue: voluntary 
euthanasia. This is again an issue that tends to polarize conservatives and liberals—conservatives 
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arguing that voluntary euthanasia is a problematic way of “playing God” (Paris & Poorman 1995; 
Verhey 1995), and liberals emphasizing choice and self-determination. Disability rights advocates 
offer a bridge between these two viewpoints: although they are generally against voluntary 
euthanasia, they also appreciate the liberal values. They argue that if we gave disabled individuals 
the credibility and self-determination they deserved, it would become clear that many in power 
don’t know what it is like to live with a disability, and that it is possible and even common to 
flourish with a disability. In general, Clifton does an excellent job bringing both sides of a polarized 
debate together via the disability literature, showing how progress in ethics can be made by 
listening to marginalized voices.  
 
5. On the Rights of Children 
 
Rights are one of the most classic and widely-discussed topics in moral philosophy. When it comes 
to the rights of beings who cannot consent to our actions, however, things get more complex—
this is one reason debates about abortion and animal rights are tricky and difficult. Pre-
autonomous children also cannot give or withhold consent. If a child needs a painful but life-
improving surgery, does performing this surgery violate their rights?8 
In “On the Child's Right to Bodily Integrity: When is the Right Infringed?” Joseph Mazor 
distinguishes two competing views of a child’s right to bodily autonomy. According to encroachment 
views, a child’s right to bodily integrity is violated just in case the child is subject to a physically 
serious bodily encroachment. On best-interests views, the child’s right to bodily integrity is infringed 
just in case the encroachment is not in the child’s best interests (see Kopelman 1997). Mazor’s 
thesis is that the best-interests conception is more plausible than the encroachment conception.  
 Mazor begins with a case that illustrates the difference between encroachment and best-
interests views. Suppose a child is seriously injured in a car accident, and the only way to save his 
life is to amputate his arm. The child’s parents authorize the surgery, so the child’s arm is removed 
                                                        
8 See Schoeman (1985) and Clayton (1997) for more on the rights of children in medical ethics.  
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and his life saved (p. XX). According to best-interests conceptions, the child’s right was not 
violated, because the amputation was in his best interests. Encroachment conceptions, by contrast, 
entail that the child’s right is violated. Crucially, however, encroachment conceptions aren’t 
committed to the view that this amputation is overall impermissible: the child’s right to his arm is 
outweighed by the child’s right to life. So, while both views give the same verdict on permissibility, 
only the encroachment conception entails that a right is infringed.  
 After explaining the two views, Mazor motivates the best-interests conception in three 
ways. First, he argues that when the theories give diverging verdicts, the implications of the best-
interests conception are more plausible. Second, he argues that the best-interests view can make 
better sense of intrapersonal and interpersonal clashes of rights. Third, the best-interests 
conception provides a more unified theory of child and adult bodily autonomy. We’ll take each in 
turn.  
 Mazor considers parents who give their child a minor cleft lip surgery. This surgery is not 
medically necessary but is in the best interests of the child. The best-interests conception can easily 
explain why this surgery is permissible: it accords with the child’s interests, so no right is violated. 
The encroachment conception, however, has a much more difficult time explaining this 
permissibility. Since the surgery is not medically necessary, it’s not clear that another one of the 
child’s rights (like the child’s right to life) would outweigh the child’s right to bodily autonomy. 
And generally, the encroachment conception has quite a bit of difficulty explaining why beneficial 
but medically unnecessary encroachments are permissible, while the best-interests view can easily 
explain this.  
 Second, consider a case where a child is injured in a car accident, and the only way for him 
to survive is to give him a second child’s kidney. Even if this second child’s parents consent to the 
kidney removal, it seems impermissible. Despite the positive effects, this is an impermissible 
violation of the second child’s rights. Call this the interpersonal case, as it involves taking a kidney 
from one child and giving it to another. This contrasts with the previously-discussed intrapersonal 
 12 
case, that involves a single child who requires an amputation to save his own life. In the case that 
involves only one child, the amputation seems permissible. The best-interests view can explain the 
differing verdicts: in the intrapersonal case, the encroachment is in the child’s best interests—it’s 
the only way to save his life. In the interpersonal case, the encroachment is not in the child’s best 
interests, since the kidney is for another child. The encroachment view, however, has a much more 
difficult time with these cases. As Mazor notes (p. XX): “In both cases we have an infringement 
of one child’s right to bodily integrity on the one hand and respect for one child’s right to life on 
the other.” Then, it isn’t clear that the encroachment conception can explain our differing verdicts 
about intrapersonal and interpersonal cases.  
 Finally, the best-interests conception coheres better with accounts of adults’ right to bodily 
autonomy. In the case of adults, informed consent plays a major role and the physical seriousness 
of an encroachment plays a very minor role. This is another point that favors best-interests 
conceptions: “Since what fundamentally matters in the case of autonomous adults is not the 
physical seriousness of the encroachment but rather the presence or absence of informed consent, 
the focus on physical seriousness in the case of children is puzzling” (Mazor 2021: p. XX). Mazor 
suggests that the best-interests view is a natural analog to informed consent. Mazor concludes that 
when it comes to the rights of children, we should pay attention to what is in a child’s best interests, 
rather than merely to whether there’s a bodily encroachment. 
 
 
6. The Ethics of Creation 
 
We’ve now seen three articles that address the rights of fetuses and an article on the rights of 
children. In “Harming and Wronging in Creating,” Shlomo Cohen addresses the rights of a third 
group: those who do not yet exist (see also Gubilini 2012, Nucci 2014, and Petre 2017).  
 Cohen begins by explaining Parfit’s non-identity problem (1987). Pretheoretically, it’s 
plausible that a morally wrong act is morally wrong because it harms someone or makes someone 
worse off. As Parfit (1987: 363) puts it, “what is bad must be bad for someone.” However, this 
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intuitive thought doesn’t seem to apply when it comes to creating people. In cases of creation, we 
can do things that would normally be considered harmful. But if our action is a necessary cause of 
someone’s existence, and their lives are worth living, then it seems like rather than wronging them, 
we’ve done them a favor (p. XX). For example, suppose I am a farmer who treats my animals 
poorly so that their lives are barely worth living. It’s not clear that you can blame or stop me from 
breeding new animals who are also subject to these poor conditions. Without my breeding, these 
animals would not exist, and surely a life worth living is better than not existing at all. But can this 
be right? Haven’t I hurt these animals in some problematic way?  
 Cohen’s paper makes progress on this puzzle by focusing on two topics: harming and 
wronging. First, he distinguishes between comparative and non-comparative notions of harm and 
motivates the need for a middle-view of harm. Then, he utilizes his view of harm to answer the 
question: “when can our acts wrong future people whose existence depends on those acts?” He 
maintains that adequately answering this question requires us to expand our concept of wronging.  
 Comparative views of harm are views on which harming makes someone worse off. For 
example, if I punch you in the face and give you a black eye, I make you worse off and therefore 
harm you. However, comparative views of harm are subject to the non-identity problem: suppose 
you create someone with a terrible life that is barely worth living. According to the comparative 
view, you have not harmed them. They are not “worse off” in any sense, because they otherwise 
would not exist. This seems like the wrong verdict.   
Some instead opt for non-comparative views of harm: views on which harm imposes on 
someone an intrinsically bad condition. However, this view is problematic for other reasons. 
Shiffrin (1999: 127ff) gives an example explained by Cohen (p. XX): 
A wealthy man (“Wealthy”) decides to shower the residents of an inaccessible 
island from the sky with gold cubes, each worth $5 million. A person whose arm 
is broken by the cube that falls on him (“Unlucky”) may indeed be extremely 
fortunate on balance, but it would be unreasonable, says Shiffrin, to deny that 
having his arm broken nonetheless constitutes a harm. We could understand, 
moreover, if Unlucky decides to sue Wealthy for having put his life in danger and 
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broken his arm in return for an unsolicited benefit, but we obviously could not 
reach such judgment unless we conceded that he was indeed harmed. 
 
In this case, Unlucky is not harmed, even though the fact that his arm is broken is an intrinsically 
bad state. And in general, all life involves at least some suffering, so on the non-comparative view, 
all creation is a harm. So both views are problematic: the comparative view of harm under-
generalizes (virtually no procreation is harmful) and the non-comparative view of harm over-
generalizes (all procreation is harmful).  
 Cohen uses this to motivate the need for “a middle view” of harm. First, he proposes what 
he calls the “discretization test” (p. XX). This determines when a burden is an essential part of a 
benefit (the broken arm in the gold cube case), and when a burden is independent of a benefit (the 
fact that I randomly decide to punch you today isn’t less harmful because I made you dinner last 
week). Cohen suggests that the more integral the burden is to the benefit, the less likely it is that 
the burden is independent. Another rule of thumb is to ask: is an apology called for? If not, then 
the burden is likely an essential part of a benefit. Cohen gives the following example (p. XX): 
suppose I know you are struggling with money so I give you my winning lottery ticket. You win 
$1,000,000. However, you are required to pay $20,000 in taxes. Did I harm you? No; the tax burden 
is an essential part of the benefit. By contrast, if I give you a tax-free $1,000,000 but stole $20,000 
from you last week, then the burden is not an essential part of the benefit, and I owe you an 
apology for stealing your money.  
To determine if something is a harm, then, we first apply the discretization test: is the 
burden part of some overall positive change? If it is, then the act in question isn’t a harm (e.g. the 
gold cube case and the taxed lottery ticket case). If the burden is not a part of some overall positive 
change, then the non-comparative view of harm holds, so it is a harm in virtue of being a burden 
(e.g. when I punch you in the face or steal your money).  
 Finally, Cohen turns to the topic of wronging. Cohen suggests that we should expand our 
concept of wronging to recognize the possibility of wronging in creation. He summarizes his view 
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as follows (p. XX): “If creation involves no harm (per the discretization test), then there will be 
no wronging either.  If it does involve harm, then we ought to investigate whether the agent's 
actions were compatible with relevant moral principles…If they were, we have a case of harming 
without wronging; if they were not, then we have a true case of wronging in creating.” Thus, on 
Cohen's view, there can be both harming and wronging in creation—wronging is unjustified 
harming. Not only does Cohen’s view help with the non-identity problem; it also gives us accounts 
of both wronging and harming that are useful for normative and applied ethics generally. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Plausibly, we have moral duties to other human persons. But how do those duties translate—or 
fail to translate—to developing fetuses, non-autonomous children, and beings who don’t yet exist? 
As the reader can see, all five papers address these beginning-of-life cases, providing answers that 
are both philosophically and practically significant. Note, though, that the summaries above don’t 
do justice to all the thoughtful philosophical points and details of these papers. For this reason, I 
encourage the reader to work through the articles in this issue themselves.   
 
 
Acknowledgements: Thanks to two anonymous referees from The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to Tyron Goldschmidt for helpful discussion. 
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